



MULTI-SECTORAL SCOPING ASSESSMENT

OF KEY SECTORS IN SELECTED DISTRICTS OF
DARA'A AND QUNEITRA
GOVERNORATES (SOUTHERN SYRIA)

9TH JUNE – 15TH AUGUST, 2018

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
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Introduction

This report is the culmination of an assessment conducted by 3iS to support Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in expanding their knowledge of five pre-determined sectors in southern Syria. These five sectors, located in Dara'a and Quneitra, were identified by GIZ prior to the start of the assessment and are as follows: 1.) agriculture; 2.) water and sanitation; 3.) irrigation; 4.) health; and 5.) waste management. This assessment was originally intended to inform future GIZ stabilisation and livelihood interventions in opposition-held areas in southern Syria, but due to the large-scale Government of Syria (GoS) operation to retake and reconcile the south, it is hoped the results of this assessment contained in this report will provide a detailed overview of the gaps, needs and requirements of the five sectors and what the development requirements will be moving forward.

The assessment that this report looks to detail was intended to gather and explore information on available markets and value chains as well as flow and access of goods and services at the district level for each of the five identified sectors. Where possible, the assessment

also looked to assess the availability of sectoral goods and services on local markets at the sub-district level in order to identify dysfunctional value chains to help inform how local markets could be stimulated, so that needs can be met and to improve vital service delivery along the pre-identified value chains. Existing supply routes and modes for goods imported and exported into and from Dara'a and Quneitra, of particular importance to the local population in relation to the five sectors, were also identified and examined, wherever possible. Relevant infrastructure and assets for public service delivery and accessible by Local Councils (LCs) were identified where applicable and will be discussed in the sector theme sections later in this report. This report also intends to describe the current state of the aforementioned sectors and identify existing needs and availability of relevant key products and services. Key stakeholders for each of the five sectors have also been identified wherever possible and have been utilised to assist in the description of dynamics that underlie decision-making at local levels and any gaps which might be apparent.



Limitations and Constraints

The limitations and constraints encountered whilst conducting this assessment include the following:

Reliability of data – Due to the operating environment, there is always a concern that data may be unreliable. However, every effort has been made to mitigate against this by triangulating wherever possible.

Data expiration – Whilst this was alleviated as much as feasibly possible through timely data collection, due to the constraints of the operating environment, it is possible that some data will not remain valid for very long due to the dynamic and changing situation in southern Syria.

Safety and security – The safety and security of project staff and participants was paramount throughout the data collection phase of this project and every effort was made to mitigate risks to project personnel.

Participant's personal security concerns – Most of the information contained within this report came from key informants (KIs) based in the area of project focus and whilst this is believed to be reliable and accurate, it is possible that some information was withheld in order to maintain the participants' personal security.

Time restrictions of project – Whilst every effort has been made to provide a holistic and detailed account of the situation relevant to the five project themes, due to the short-nature of this assessment, it was only possible to provide a snap-shot of the operational environment. Some KIs were unable to provide accounts given that they were in transit having been displaced by ongoing conflict. Given more time, this project could have had a more granular approach and had time to identify, approach and interview even more KIs.

Current context in southern Syria

Dara'a and Quneitra Governorates are located in the southwest corner of Syria. Quneitra is to the west of Dara'a and borders Israel and is situated in the Golan Heights. The Rif Damascus is the northern perimeter of Dara'a and to the east is As-Sweida Governorate. Dara'a borders with Jordan at its most southerly boundary. Dara'a is encompassed by a large, comparatively flat area of land which steadily descends southwards, named the Horan Plain. West of the Horan Plain in Quneitra, the Golan Heights form a plateau of high ground which gradually slopes to the northwest of Dara'a and descends much more rapidly into the Yarmouk Valley in Dara'a's southwest sector. The volcanic mountain, Jabal al Arab, which is located just outside Dara'a eastern border in As-Sweida, sharply descends to the Horan Plain and forms Dara'a's most easterly boundary. Yarmouk Valley, the lowest point in the region, has water gradually flowing into it from the Horan Plain which is fed from the respective watersheds of Jabal al Araba and the Golan Heights.

The M5 highway is the region's most significant route for goods movement historically. Crossing the Syrian/Jordanian border at the Nasib/Jaber border crossing, the international motorway continues north to Damascus, the Syrian capital city. The M5 separates Dara'a governorate into two sectors; eastern and western. Due to the conflict in Syria, the border with Jordan at Nasib/Jaber has remained closed for the majority of the past seven years and therefore the M5 is no longer used as a primary trade route for supplies entering Syria. In response to this, opposition controlled areas used an alternative main supply route (MSR), which was serving as the primary route for supplies and goods moving into Dara'a and Quneitra. This MSR moves from As-Sweida city off As-Sweida's main highway from Damascus. The MSR moved west through Busra Esh-Sham, from where it navigates across the southern half of Dara'a governorate and intersects with the M5 highway near Dara'a al Balad. From that location, it continues into the western sector and heads north services different locations from Nawa, the largest city in Dara'a. The MSR was critical for social, political and economic functions and kept opposition areas running throughout the conflict.

Local Councils (LCs)

Before the war in Syria started, governance structures were very centralised hierarchical systems, with all major decision making, policy and support functions coming out of Damascus. This created difficulties for communities at the start of the conflict, as there was no real authority to take on basic service requirements to meet the everyday needs of residents. This created a

necessity for local grassroots bodies to establish Local Councils (LCs) to address major services, including waste management, maintenance of water networks and water distribution, bread provision and counting IDPs. LCs were often made up of former government personnel, such as civil servants and technocrats who lived in the local community. Furthermore, these individuals had technical expertise and knowledge of how services were run prior to the conflict and were able to maintain the bakeries, sewage systems, electrical grids, and water reservoirs. However, as the conflict went on, the LCs experienced great financial constraints and were largely unable to collect taxes from equally impoverished communities. Many of the former civil servants and technocrats also fled Syria as refugees and this left LCs without sufficient funding or technical experience to function at pre-war levels, with key infrastructure lacking maintenance and LCs having to provide less complex services. With the dispersal of these former government personnel, authority began to transition towards well respected community members, such as tribal leaders, and these individuals took control of the LCs. These council were able to sustain basic services and were developed bodies to coordinate with INGOs and humanitarian actors, which is where the majority of funding and service support came from throughout the conflict.

June 18th onwards

On the night of 18/19th June, the Government of Syria (GoS) initiated a large-scale military operation to recapture the last of the opposition-held enclaves in southern Syria. The offensive began with a push on eastern Dara towards Busra Al-Sham, Eastern Ghariyah, and Western Ghariyah and was met with limited opposition resistance. Due to limited resistance and momentum on the part of GoS, advances were rapid. On 22nd June, with the clashes bearing within close range of the Jordanian border, the Jordanian military was deployed to Jordan's northern border. On 24th June, Government of Russia (GoR) provided air cover for the offensive for the first time in the operation, targeting a medical facility in Busra al-Harir. Subsequently, GoS were able to capture most of al-Lajat. On 27th June, opposition leaders in eastern Dara entered reconciliation negotiations facilitated by GoR. Concurrent to this, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) seized control of the Brigade 52 base.

After a series of rapid GoS advances towards Dara'a City, opposition forces in the vicinity of the Narib BCP began surrendering to GoS and entering into reconciliation negotiations on 7th July. GoS-allied forces began preparations for the recapture of Dara City on 08 July. In response, Armed Opposition Group (AOG) elements united underneath the 'Army of the South' umbrella. In response, GoR and GoS forces conducted heavy air raids on the city. After days of heavy clashes, GoS recaptured the city on 12th July. As

of 16th July, the entirety of eastern Dara had reconciled with GoS. Buses for those outside of the reconciliation framework departed for Idleb. Following reconciliation, RAN reported severe movement limitations within villages due to heavy restrictions by SAA personnel. Negotiations for local governance structures post-reconciliation were ongoing.

On 15th July in western Dara'a, GoS commenced heavy aerial bombardment of areas surrounding the strategically valuable Tal Hara, which provided a 360-degree elevated vantage point over remaining AOG-controlled areas. This occurred against a backdrop of ongoing reconciliation negotiations. As reconciliation negotiations progressed, they began to take a similar shape to those reached in Busra es-Sham, plus the provision that GoS forces take control of pre-2011 military installations.

On 15th July, GoS forces advanced northwards to Quneitra in conjunction with heavy aerial bombardment of northern Jaydour. Research and Analysis Network reported GoS control over Ein Eltineh, Sweisa, Qseibeh, and Ghadir al Bostan.

On 17th July, Research and Analysis Network reported that GoS affiliated forces seized the areas surrounding the Tal Hara by force. Furthermore, GoS commenced heavy aerial bombardment of Nawa City, which applied pressure to reconciliation negotiations. Concurrent to the reconciliation negotiations, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces continued to clash with GoS-affiliated forces on the outskirts of the town. This was treated as separate from the negotiations rather than a 'spoiler.' Differences in freedom of movement were reported in areas under the purview of GoS vs. Russian military police. On 19th July, RAN reported full reconciliation of Quneitra Governorate, with terms mirroring those reached in Jaydour plus extra provisions governing freedom of expression and follow-up on detention of opposition personnel. Notably, HTS and KKBW personnel were excluded from the reconciliation deal and sporadic clashes between GoS forces were reported. The clashes were a barrier to IDP movements. On 23rd July, RAN reported negotiations between GoS officials and representatives from AOGs regarding coordination on an offensive at recapturing the remaining JKBW territory. The individual reconciliation process continued to be opaque, with little public confidence in the process, but was ongoing.

On 25th July, GoS began heavy aerial bombardment of the Yarmouk basin, with the purported participation of GoR. Clashes were ongoing until 31st July, when GoS forces declared control over the entirety of the area. Furthermore, the opening of BCPs with Jordan was discussed concurrent to the establishment of a Russian MoD mechanism to facilitate the return of refugees.

Methodology

Following a kick-off meeting, this assessment began with recruitment of six national (Syrian) enumerators to conduct field interviews inside the area of project focus. Alongside this, a comprehensive desk review was undertaken at the start of the assessment – including sector specific and multi-sectoral assessments and other situation reports – to identify information gaps as well as inform the approach to be taken, including appropriate respondents, preferred data collection methods and questionnaire design. This was followed by meetings with a total of seven relevant stakeholders in Amman to further underline information gaps and define the approach for the field phase. These respondents were made up of key personnel in cluster support groups, NGO personnel working on project implementation relevant to the five sectors and individuals knowledgeable on the sectors. Key Informants (KIs) were then identified who could serve as relevant respondents for each sector, through using a grounded and existing extensive network of personnel within Syria. 3iS worked to identify, approach and interview the most informed and senior individuals within the sectors, who would be best placed to provide detailed and current information for this assessment.

All questionnaires used in this assessment were designed in English and translated into Arabic by professional translators to conduct the interviews. These questionnaires went through a rigorous testing process in Amman, with additional support from enumerators in Syria.

Prior to the data collection phase, enumerators undertook a detailed and comprehensive enumerator training package run by 3iS personnel on how to effectively and safely collect data in the field. Once this was completed, the enumerators worked with 3iS field operations staff to assist in the identification of KIs.

Due to the security constraints in southern Syria during this assessment, the first and second phases of field data collection were combined, with enumerators making contact with the KIs and coordinating interviews with 3iS personnel in Amman. Enumerators sat with the KIs whilst the interviews were conducted over Skype and assisted in soliciting broader themes at the sub-regional. These semi-structured interviews between the KIs and 3iS personnel in Amman looked to delve into more detail, based on a probing of themes as they arose. During this phase, four of the KIs were uncomfortable executing the interview in full, as they felt risk to their own personal security. In these cases, the interviews were immediately terminated, however, the KIs later completed the interviews by filling out the questionnaires in writing and sending the completed e-documents to 3iS via WhatsApp.

KI respondents included, but were not limited to: Head of Services Committee within a Local Council; Senior Member of a Local Council; individual responsible for water and dams in Dara'a governorate; Head of a Local Council Water Util; Head of Dara'a Agricultural Directorate; Agricultural Engineers; Heads of local (Syrian) NGOs; other key individuals closely involved with sector themes. In total, 20 KI interviews were conducted with respondents inside southern Syria for this assessment.

The final phase of data collection involved the cleaning and analysis of questionnaire responses. In a small amount of cases, follow-up information was requested from the KIs to confirm comments, which was relayed from 3iS through enumerators. Analysis entailed looking at patterns, trends and relationships, and overlaying complementary context on the ever-changing situation on the ground. This report is the culmination of these activities and looks to translate these results into an appropriately holistic narrative.

Sector themes

The contents contained from here on in the report are detailed overviews of the situations regarding each of the five identified sectors. As stated earlier, the field phase of this assessment was disrupted by the operation undertaken by Russian-backed GoS forces to retake the opposition controlled south. There were significant challenges placed on the residents of southern Syria during this time, and maintaining functioning basic services became secondary, as huge numbers of people from the areas of focus were displaced from their communities. Fuel prices increased by up to 200% during this period and the cost of importing of goods and supplies entering southern Syria inflated exponentially. It is difficult to give an overview of the five pre-identified sectors in their exact state at present, as much remains unknown about what services look like right now and what will happen in the coming weeks and months. Therefore, this report provides an overview of what services looked like up to the point of GoS takeover (starting 18/19th June), thus giving an understanding of the gaps, needs and requirements that existed and issues which are likely to continue once services fully transition to GoS control.

During this assessment, KIs reported that Government of Syria rhetoric at present is to establish fully functioning services for all themes covered in this report within the next six months. However, given the scale of rehabilitation, maintenance and refurbishment required for all services, this is a remarkably optimistic and perhaps unrealistic goal to achieve in such a short time. Furthermore, it was reported by a number of KIs that renewal of services would be prioritised for locations which were more in-line and supportive of GoS ideologies, though more detailed information on this was not obtained. Overall, it was reported by KIs that the main focus and priority for GoS at this present time is to establish clear and unrestricted security and access for GoS operations within southern Syria. Until this is achieved, it is unlikely that services will be fully restored.



Agriculture

State of the agricultural sector in Dara'a and Quneitra by June 2018

Dara'a and Quneitra governorates have historically been agricultural areas, where a variety of products are grown, with specificities based on the agroecological characteristics of each area (dependent on rainfall zones). The eastern region of Dara'a is dominated by rainfed crops, especially wheat and barley. The western region of Dara'a sees a more diverse crop production with most winter and summer crops and fruit trees (olives, pomegranate, grapes, peach, plum, pear). Quneitra is mostly known for its animal husbandry, but cattle and sheep are also bred across Dara'a governorate. Some communities and areas are more known for specific productions (for example, tomatoes around Tafs, potatoes around Nawa, okra and livestock in Quneitra).

Since the beginning of the conflict in 2011, agricultural value chains have experienced critical challenges, affecting both production and consumption sides. Availability and affordability of inputs for production has been a consistent challenge, with high costs of fuel (needed for operating water pumps and machinery), and inputs such as chemicals, while generally available, were found at high prices. Increase in output prices would generally not proportionally follow increased production costs and therefore create a critical imbalance where farmers would sometimes have to sell at a loss (in high season, dumping and waste of produce would not be rare, for example in the tomato value chain). Indeed, due to a constrained purchasing power, demand from local households could hardly meet increased produce prices on local markets, and marketing channels to export local production to government-controlled areas or abroad were severely constrained, either by the difficulties in crossing multiple checkpoints along the trading routes to GoS-controlled areas or because of the closing of the Nasib border (previously major export passage to Jordan and other neighbouring countries).



200% ▲

Price increase

Cost of importing of goods and supplies inflated accordingly



Agriculture and local councils dependent on **external funding** to keep operational.



In opposition-held areas of Dara'a and Quneitra, support that was previously brought by the GoS would no longer apply. This entailed heavy support of strategic crops (including wheat) through the management of most of the supply chain, from input supply (seeds, subsidized inputs), to managing aggregation and storage in silos, distribution to mills and bakeries (also supported with inputs) to enable local households to access bread at low prices. Since the areas changed control in 2011, opposition authorities have attempted to replicate a similar system. However, this system would be very costly to maintain, and the Directorate of Agriculture and local councils would be highly dependent on the availability of external funding in order to keep it operational. Therefore, inputs for agricultural production (crop and livestock) could not be supported anymore and farmers would rely on private traders to source the necessary inputs (some agricultural support programmes were brought by humanitarian agencies, but the needs remained high and constant). Veterinary services were severely lacking, as were most extension services – due to the lack of trained extension workers, and the lack of funding. Disrupted cold chains (due to poor access to energy) also affected the availability of vaccines as well as processing facilities. Processing facilities were affected by the same challenges in accessing inputs and spare parts at reasonable costs, therefore impacting on the quality of processing as well as their capacity to diversify processing methods to cope with disrupted trade routes.

The main role of local councils focused on coordinating humanitarian aid, notably in the provision of bread to local communities. Their inability to provide further service to the agricultural sector was maintained by the lack of funding.

Current impact of the June-July 2018 operations on the agricultural sector

Pre-existing challenges (pre-June 2018) have been further exacerbated: high prices of fuel, low demand on local markets due to eroding purchasing power and displacement of population.

Farmers in many areas were displaced, leading to a lack of irrigation of their land in some areas in critical times of crop growth and potential huge crop losses for this summer season (many farmers will face a lost season).

Any agricultural support from NGOs and aid agencies has stopped and support from local institutions is also non-existent. It is currently uncertain as to when and how any kind of institutional support will recover. There were hopes among key informants that GoS would re-open their lines of support in reconciled areas, as prior to the changes in control, but no one could know when this would happen.

Most key informants reported that people were currently focusing on meeting their daily bread needs rather than on more medium-term needs (insuring income).



Agricultural **support** from NGOs, aid agencies and local institutions **stopped**.




The June-July 2018 operations have affected agricultural value chains in various ways:

- Livestock herders have, to large extents, resorted to selling large numbers of livestock heads, livelihood coping mechanism that indicates a very high level of crisis. According to KIs interviewed in both Dara'a and Quneitra, this is the highest use of such a coping strategy since the conflict started in 2011. As a result of large supplies on local markets, livestock prices have drastically decreased, by 30 to 50% in certain areas. As an example, a sheep sold at SYP 20,000 in Spring 2018 would now be sold at SYP 10,000; milk decreased from SYP 135 to SYP 75 per litre (and, in some instances, it was reportedly given for free), and meat from SYP 1,500 to 700 per kg. Live cows saw the most dramatic decrease, from USD 2,000 to USD 150.
- Vegetable production has been highly affected by displacement of populations and a reduced access to their lands for farmers who could not irrigate crops in a critical growth period, for 15 to 25 days or more. Large amounts of vegetable production were therefore expected to be lost.
- It was reported that the wheat harvest season had ended by the time the operations started, and the wheat value chain was therefore less affected. However, it could not be confirmed how the trading and distribution of wheat grain and wheat flour would happen, given the changes in control, as no KI could say whether negotiated agreements included provisions on the transition of management of the wheat value chain. The Nasib mill (the largest mill in previously opposition-controlled areas of SW Syria) was not operational at the time of this assessment, since workers had left. Only private mills were reportedly functioning in some areas. The SIG-GOSM, the General Office for Seed Multiplication of the Syrian

Interim Government, equivalent to the GoS-GOSM, was to be taken over by the GoS. It was reported that SIG-GOSM staff were promised by GoS to be maintained, but at the time of the assessment, this could not be confirmed.

- It was unclear whether production of olives would be affected, with a harvest season coming in November. In general, fruit production has also been affected by the lack of available and affordable fuel for irrigation in the summer season.
- Potato, cucumber and tomato production in Eastern Dara'a were reportedly highly affected than in Tafs area, due to lesser access to irrigation (lack of fuel for water pumps).
- It was also reported that, in the western part of Dara'a, grain and animal feed vendors were moving to the southwest (Tal Shihad, Zayzoun), following herder movements, where it was reportedly more secure and accessible for new businesses and vendors.
- For summer crops, key informants reported that farmers were still dealing with the same middlemen as before the operations, for example on the Jasim wholesale market. Prices were highly unstable, depending on road access and supply (disrupted by military operations).



Water and Sanitation

Drinking water

Prior to the war, water services, including supply, maintenance and management, were operated by the Government of Syria at Municipality level. Despite southern Syria's relatively abundant water supply, many villages had poor access to official water services and were reliant on private water sources to service their needs, particularly among rural Bedouin communities, who were not connected to water supply networks. However, wells and water networks were operated significantly more efficiently than they are at present, with water delivered on average every two days and available for 24 hours, and the majority of households received sufficient water supplies and at minimal costs.

Since the start of the conflict, access to water in southern Syria has been largely dependent upon networks of water trucking between wells and villages, which is the main source of drinking water for households. Very few households are actually connected directly to direct water supplies. A small minority have access to private wells from which they can manage their own water supply. Water trucking is an expensive mechanism for supplying water to communities, as it is heavily reliant on fuel and well-maintained trucks to deliver water from village to village. Supply routes remain restricted due to the conflict, which made it difficult to bring both vehicle parts and fuel into Opposition controlled areas. This has had the effect of raising fuel and vehicle part prices significantly, thus establishing an environment in which households must pay a large percentage (cited as 13% on average by NPM, July 2017, and KIs stated that the average monthly expenditure on water was approximately US\$50 per household) of their income on acquiring drinking water through trucking networks, though the actual cost of which significantly fluctuates on a regular basis. There are also an abundance of further logistical challenges involved when delivering water with trucks, which often means some households can go for periods of up to several days without access to drinking water or at minimum not having enough water to meet their household needs, though according to KIs interviewed during this assessment, this is relatively rare. Some villages have minimal or no public



Water trucking

is the main supplying mechanism to communities, and reliant on **fuel** and **maintenance**.



wells and are therefore reliant on private wells belonging to individual landowners to distribute water among the local community, which further increases the cost of water services for households in such locations.

On average, households receive between 10L and 40L of drinking water person per day per day, with water being supplied on average every 15 days, according to KIs interviewed during this assessment. Costs for water vary per area, due to a host of reasons including access to water sources, fuel prices and security. Furthermore, if the local well for one village becomes unserviceable for whatever reason, the cost to transport and deliver water resources to that village from another serviceable location will be significantly increased for local residents.

Geographically, the Yarmouk basin serves as a relatively abundant source of groundwater with good accessibility to wells water. However, due to the security situation in the south, access to these water sources have been significantly disrupted for many villages in the area, particularly due to ISIS-held areas controlling the western sector of the Yarmouk Valley.

Water access in the eastern sector of Dara'a governorate proves more of a challenge than it does in the more water-abundant western sector. Geographically, the western sector is drier, resulting in less groundwater sources, and the water table is considerably deeper, making water pumping a longer, more expensive and more challenging process. Subsequently, the eastern sector has less functioning wells and is even more reliant on expensive water trucking networks to meet household requirements. Despite this, less households in the eastern sector are reported to have water scarcity and the majority have continued to operate with a sufficient supply throughout the conflict.



Machinery theft, supply access
and **security issues** hinder
well rehabilitation efforts.



Since the start of the conflict, there have been moderate efforts to rehabilitate non-functioning wells, whether they were damaged or destroyed through lack of maintenance or conflict damage. Such efforts to rehabilitate wells have predominantly been sponsored by a small number of NGOs, though due to machinery theft, constraints on supply access and security issues, such initiatives have had experienced many challenges in their implementation.

The main stakeholder involved with water services in southern Syria was the Service Committee within the Local Council (LC). They were responsible for overseeing the distribution of water through water truck supply routes and filling water tanks; pumping water and management of public wells, and; registering households in their area of operation who require water supply. The Local Councils receive no revenue to fund water services, except through payment from residents for services provided and subsidised bakeries, which serve to supplement a small amount of activities undertaken by the LCs, namely paying for vehicle fuel. LC staff size relating to water services varied from location to location, but was assessed on average as between 3 and 6 personnel, receiving a salary of approximately US\$80 weekly when funds were available.

During this assessment, a number of Syrian NGOs were identified as supporting rehabilitation of wells and providing additional support to LCs. Temkine was identified as undertaking an uncompleted needs assessment for services required and provided financial assistance for the rehabilitation of wells in some villages. Temkine also procured parts for water services, including generators and solar panels for pumping water, among other miscellaneous items (most of which passed through Turkey or Jordan, then through GoS controlled supply routes and checkpoints before reaching their final location), which were made available at the local market. Syrian Engineers for Construction and Development were undertaking WASH project, namely in Kafr Shams and paid LC employee's salaries for an unknown period of time. Chlorine tablets and liquid for water disinfection were largely available at local markets, which were a further product of local and international NGO (including CARE) activities. However, due to the most recent security developments, any NGOs which were supporting such activities have now ceased all relevant operations in southern Syria.

The main issues facing drinking water services in southern Syria during the past years of conflict were predominately cited by KIs during this assessment as being the high fuel prices, with fuel being critical for pumping water from wells with generators and distributing water to communities with trucks. Furthermore, the lack of electricity as an alternative means for water pumping is a major issue, which is of course disruptive to all aspects of life. The lack of maintenance for water networks and wells is also a major issue, with parts being expensive and hard to obtain and many experienced technical personnel no longer available, having been displaced by conflict.

Wastewater and sanitation services

Prior to the war, sanitation services were run relatively successfully by the Municipality government, with well-maintained sewage system canal networks and collection from household cesspits on a regular basis taking wastewater to central locations across the municipality for disposal. During the war, services were taken on by the Local Councils who were responsible for removal of sludge from septic tanks and disposal. Throughout the conflict, as LC funds depleted and access was restrained by security, the quality of service diminished as LCs were unable to continue the level of service with maintenance of sewage systems and removal of sludge from septic tanks. Subsequently, the sanitation networks in the majority of southern Syria are now in a state of disrepair, so all sludge removed from its location of origin for disposal is done with trucks. Networks are deep enough underground, so were largely unaffected by direct conflict damage, but suffered from a lack of maintenance due to LC's financial constraints. When funding and security access permitted, LCs worked to remove de-sludge the domestic and transport it to locations outside of urbanised areas (usually at locations averaging 2-5km from villages) for burning the collected sludge. At present and for the past few years, many households have been responsible for burning their own sewage waste on site, which has caused an increased risk of both pollution to water supplies from groundwater contamination and could have direct risk to human health through increased illness and disease.



Many households **burn sewage** waste on site: increased risk of **pollution** and **illness**.



Irrigation

Expectedly, the irrigation situation in southern Syria is closely linked to agriculture and much of this theme directly correlates to what is written in section 1.) of this report.

There is an immediately identifiable difference between the irrigation situation in Quneitra and Dara'a. Namely, Quneitra has a considerably more abundant water source for irrigation from a number of dams located in the governorate, whereas, Dara'a is almost solely reliant upon well water to irrigate neighboring agricultural land. Before the crisis, dams were opened in June and irrigation tunnels would take water to land surrounding the dams for farmers to irrigate their land. This process hasn't changed significantly throughout the conflict, however, there are now significantly less operational dams in the region. According to KIs interviewed during this assessment, there are now only four out of 15 fully operational dams in Quneitra which are capable of irrigating land in the surrounding areas. These dams are located in Hajeh, Kodneh, Sahem Golan and Um-Aletham.



Quneitra: abundant sources of irrigation water from **dams**.

Dara'a: reliant on **well** water for irrigation



Dams in southern Syria have continued to fall under the authority of the Ministry of Irrigation, located in Damascus. All maintenance and operations are officially managed by GoS employees, who still receive salaries from the national government. In practice, however, there has been little maintenance and operational support from GoS to run these dams and maintenance has usually been undertaken by NGOs such as AFAK and Olive Branch who were able to operate a handful of dams functioning at reasonable capacity throughout the conflict.


According to the KIs interviewed during this assessment, the operational dams require some maintenance, but overall, they have been kept in relatively good condition. It has been difficult to maintain the dams with the current security situation and lack of easy access to necessary parts and materials. However, it is reported that the reservoirs have had more water this season than they did the same time last year, which is a positive indicator for structural integrity of the dams. Following

heavy rains in winter, some dams were also opened to contribute to the filling of other functioning dams in the area. Landowners around the dams are the biggest beneficiaries of water for irrigation, as they are able to freely tap into the water resources by connecting to the pumping lines at no cost.

As previously stated, the eastern sector or Dara'a, along with the majority of the governorate's western sector have not had access to irrigation water from dams and have been solely reliant upon wells for their agricultural needs. Farmers have, in some cases, established small, grassroots syndicates to fund, maintain and distribute water from wells in their local area. However, due to the high price of water pumping from wells and truck distribution because of fuel prices, irrigation remains far more expensive and logistically challenging than it does in areas served by dams water. Solar panels are a viable alternative for power and in many cases, this is an important cost-saving measure for farmers. Solar panels are reportedly relatively widely available at markets, being delivered through supply routes from Jordan, China and elsewhere with the support of NGOs.

As stated previously in this report, the most recent development in southern Syria forced the displacement of hundreds of thousands of residents from their homes, many of whom were farmers integral to upholding the southern agricultural sector. Subsequently, vast swathes of cropland went through some of the year's hottest weather conditions without any form of irrigation to sustain growth. Despite the majority of farmers now

returning to their land, in hot, dry conditions, between 15 and 30 days without irrigation, crops will die and cannot be restored. It remains unclear as to how much land will be unusable following this period, but it will not be possible to plant further crops until the period between October and April, ergo this year's harvest may be one of the worst in recent record. Therefore, support (in terms of importation of products, fuel, fertilizer, seeds, etc.) to farmers in this agriculturally-prominent area will be vital for maintaining livelihoods looking-forward.



Large areas of cropland went **without irrigation** this summer due to **conflict displacement**



The Government of Syria are now implementing some initial activities to fix and re-establish irrigation systems, but as stated early-on in this report, the major focus is on establishing security. Some additional support is coming from the Syrian Red Crescent, along with minor assistance from the Government of Russia.



Health

Since the war began in 2011, health services in southern Syria have been copied from pre-war systems in an attempt to maintain the same level of delivery. However, due to numerous challenges, funding and resource limitations, it has been difficult for health facilities to keep functioning and providing vital medical services required by communities in Dara'a and Quneitra. One of the major challenges facing health operations in the south is the lack of medical supplies available locally at markets, with the exception of basic painkillers. The vast majority of these supplies come from cross-border shipments through Jordan from NGO and humanitarian agencies. Medicines such as narcotics and psychotropics, which are easily abused if not proscribed correctly by medical staff, are inherently difficult to move cross-border, meaning significant pain-relief medication is largely unavailable to patients in need.

Such partner organisations funding medical services in Dara'a and Quneitra include; UOSSM, SAMS, MSF and WHO. Bluemont was also providing material rehabilitation of physical infrastructure through Syrian Essential Services (SES II) and Syrian Governance Services (Bluemont/Tatweer SGS). Healthcare services receive a lot of in-kind support through donations from Syrian diaspora in the Gulf, the US and other global locations, which are a vital contribution for keeping health facilities running. However, it remains unknown what these funds amount to. Furthermore, there is minimal insight as to the level of budget and funding health services actually receive and what budget they have access to.

Medical staff salaries are also almost entirely covered by partner organisations. However, due to the high demand for medical services in southern Syria, additional staff were brought on to meet requirements, though the pool of funding was then being shared around more personnel, meaning staff were being paid less than they were entitled to. Further funding was being delivered cross-line from Gaziantep to cover health sector wages, however, during this assessment, some Amman-based partner interviews disclosed that there was minimal coordination with the Amman Health Cluster with these initiatives. Furthermore, GIZ received some direct criticism from a number of Amman-based partner interviews for paying salaries directly to the Dara'a Directorate of Health (DoH). It was argued that this stabilisation funding directly for healthcare services is considered as imperilling the visage of neutrality and increasing the risk of strikes against health facilities. It is advised that paying LCs directly who can then choose to use these funds for health services is considered quite different and is an ethically more appropriate method of assistance from a security perspective.

One of the main shortcomings to providing appropriate and quality healthcare services in southern Syria is the lack of technically qualified staff. Trainings were being provided in some cases by partner organisations, however, there remains a significant lack of staff with the skills and education necessary to deliver the quality of services which are so essential. As an example, there are no fully qualified anaesthesiologists in the entire south and only one capable of operating as a fully knowledgeable and experienced specialist. Anaesthetic technicians are having to step up and deliver these vital services for operations and other medical procedures and whilst they are obviously gaining valuable experience through working in such challenging conditions by performing advanced procedures, they remain unqualified in terms of technical expertise. The same remains true across medical staff in most healthcare facilities, with unqualified medical students stepping up and performing as doctors and nurses who have not received their full training operating in the most challenging environments. Notably, there is only one qualified psychologist in all of southern Syria, which given the amount of psycho and social support required in a conflict environment to help treat cases post-traumatic stress, shows a genuine lack of available human resources available to deal with serious medical issues.



Significant lack of technically **qualified** health workers



Further to this, there is a significant lack of gender balance among healthcare practitioners. Given the conservative cultural norms in southern Syria, it is important to have a good mix of male and female medical staff to provide an appropriate level of care, however, this is not present in healthcare services in Dara'a and Quneitra at this time. As many as half the Obstetrician gynaecologists (Ob/Gyn) in southern Syria are male, which is a very gender-sensitive form of medical service, and culturally it would be appropriate to raise the numbers of qualified female staff performing such key practices. Equally, there are only two qualified female physiotherapists operating in southern Syria, which is a distinctly low percentage for an integral form of healthcare treatment.

Healthcare records were always shared by healthcare personnel in opposition controlled areas of southern Syria throughout the conflict and were retained by GoS up until the most recent conflict in the south. When possible, patients were evacuated cross-border to



Lack of gender balance



e.g. only two female physiotherapists in all southern Syria



Jordan or Israel during the war and some (particularly children) were taken cross-line to GoS medical facilities in Damascus for better quality treatment. However, there were heavy limitations on supplies entering from cross-line in GoS territory to opposition areas. Health facilities were also heavily targeted by airstrikes throughout the war and in the most recent build-up of force in the past two months.

Cross-line assistance for healthcare services ceased in early 2017, however, vaccine programmes continued until recently. This was predominantly coordinated by the head of healthcare in the south, Dr Khalid, who maintained coordination and communication efforts with GoS throughout the conflict. These vaccine programs, run mainly for children, had a good level of in-depth coverage throughout Dara'a, however, due to logistical reasons, coverage lacked in Quneitra, though this was not intentional denial of services. Dr Khalid was also responsible for coordinating healthcare service delivery throughout the most recent intensification of conflict in southern Syria, when many of the healthcare personnel were displaced along with the local populations. Dr Khalid compiled an active roster of medical staff locations and skills and was able to organise medical services throughout the region as the displacement occurred. Many of these healthcare facilities moved to residential locations, particularly basements to avoid targeted strikes where possible, when conflict escalated at the end of June this year.

There is presently a significant shortage of medical supplies in the south, as all warehouses in the eastern sector of Dara'a containing healthcare provisions were lost during the recent escalation in conflict. Health services are now being folded under GoS control, including many facilities and healthcare personnel. Looking forward, a technically proficient head of the Directorate of Health will be imperative to ensuring healthcare service delivery is both maintained and improved. As Dr Khalid demonstrated, it is important to practice quality health systems management and good personnel management. Equally important is maintaining neutrality and informal and formal communication lines with both GoS and any partners still intending to continue cross-border healthcare initiatives into the future. As these dynamics were established and maintained in southern Syria throughout the war, it has culminated in health workers receiving better treatment under GoS control so far than was seen in other regions which were taken over in similar circumstances.



Waste Management

As with the other most other sectors discussed in this report, waste management in southern Syria has been operated by the Local Councils. Given the operational environment and previously stated constraints on the LCs including access and security, lack of finances, inability to service and maintain assets such as vehicles and a shortage of skilled manpower, waste management activities have become notably restricted, with the quality of service significantly diminished since pre-war, when activities were managed by the Municipality Government. Previously, waste management in Dara'a and Quneitra was funded by generic taxes collected from the local population and early on in the conflict LC's attempted to collect waste management-specific taxes, but household income has dropped to such a point that residents are no longer able to pay for waste collection services. Therefore, waste management is almost solely funded by NGO support, bar some moderate revenue from public bakeries.

Despite these challenges, most LCs were able to continue operating waste management activities to some extent. Larger urban areas have maintained a higher quality of service and according to KIs, LCs were able to collect waste once or twice per week for as much as 90% in some larger villages. In smaller, more rural environments, there has been considerably more restricted access to waste management services, though LCs have worked to collect waste from such locations at least once per week where possible due to security concerns.

As anticipated, the main challenge for LCs conducting waste management activities lies in a lack of funding and inaccessibility to vehicle parts for waste collection trucks. From the KIs interviewed in this assessment, it is estimated that most LCs employ somewhere between eight and 15 personnel for waste collection activities, split between street cleaners and drivers/waste collectors. On average, these waste collectors receive an hourly income of between US\$125-150 monthly. However, as a result of minimal funds, LCs were often unable to pay employees and therefore they only receive wages when there are enough funds to allow and few employees have formal contracts.



Main **challenge** for LC waste management services was lack of funding and access to **vehicle parts**



LC waste management assets vary from location to location, though from KI interviews it is estimated that most LCs operated one or two waste collection trucks, though the functional capacity of these trucks to continue to operate for much longer without better maintenance and overhaul seems unlikely. Each waste collection truck consumes on average approximately 350L of fuel per month, at varying cost depending on availability and price of fuel. New waste collection vehicles and fleet maintenance were cited by KIs as being vital to continued waste management services.

Once household waste has been collected from villages, it is driven by truck to locations two to five kilometres from the location of origin (as specified by KIs). Once at these disposal locations, waste is discharged from the trucks into pits. From the interviewed waste management KIs, each stated that their local landfills were 2m in depth and 10m in width and burnt by the same waste collection teams/drivers who collected it. These landfills also service other villages and rural developments in the locality. Waste is also collected from markets once or twice week and is either burnt on site or transported to the same disposal locations as household waste and burnt there. As with household waste, the LCs attempted to collect waste disposal payments from markets, but due to the low income among residents, this was not followed-through. Some LCs had civil defence contracts to dispose of waste from construction sites, however, no construction waste was reported as being collected over the past several years. Similarly, there was no reported collection of electronic waste. In only one of the villages spoken to did waste disposal teams work to separate plastic and metal from regular waste in order to then sell on these items to local scrap merchants for “recycling”. It does not seem likely that this is a widespread initiative.

In some locations, clinical waste is also collected from medical facilities, the majority of which have a specialist waste manager who is responsible for separating clinical waste from regular waste. The clinical waste is



Only **one village** spoken to separated **metal** and **plastic**. Not a widespread activity



then transported to special, fenced-off waste disposal locations (also 5km outside villages on average) and burnt in pits 3m depth and 4m width (according to KIs).

Medical centres do not pay for waste disposal and were not requested to do so by the LCs. However, not all LCs can afford to separate clinical and regular waste, so it is all disposed of using the same methods.

Some local Syrian NGOs, such as Olive Branch, have provided financial support to LCs and have sponsored the salaries of waste collection employees for periods of six months or more, as well as covering the cost of



Local NGOs, such as **Olive Branch**, were vital for keeping waste management services **running throughout conflict**



rental and maintenance of trucks.

Despite the above listed efforts, LCs have struggled to effectively collect waste at a sufficient rate and as such, most villages have large amounts of household waste littering the streets. It is also believed that, certainly in rural areas, residents burn their own household waste on site without support from LCs.

Pictures showing lack of waste collection due to cessation of NGO funding and activities following GoS offensive to retake south



KIs stated the major requirements looking-forward as being improved security and security for staff at waste disposal sites. There is also a lack of black waste bags for household use, meaning residents place waste directly in bins, making collection a more difficult and time-consuming process. KIs also stated the need for increased finances to afford better maintenance of vehicles and for paying employee's salaries. Furthermore, KIs said that there was a genuine need to increase the number of trucks in the waste disposal fleets, increase the number of employees collecting waste and for better coordination of waste management efforts between communities, ideally at the sub-district level.

Following the take-over of Dara'a and Quneitra, waste management services are now transitioning back under GoS authority. It is hoped that there will be increased funds for waste collection and disposal to prevent pollution and risk of illness among local populations due to exposure to poorly managed waste. As previously stated in other sections, GoS' main priority in southern Syria is establishing security, so it could be some time before waste management services are fully functioning again.

Conclusion

This report is the culmination of a two-month assessment to gather and explore information on the five predetermined sector themes, as detailed above. The assessment attempted to gather and explore information on how services are operating and how they are managed and supplied. This report has analysed and explored how the services related to each theme adapted to the war as the years progressed and how services have been run and maintained throughout the past seven years. Each sector has numerous issues and challenges in terms of service delivery, which stakeholders have attempted to overcome through various mechanisms. However, issues such as financing, security access for personnel and supply routes, and a lack of skilled and experienced manpower transcend throughout the different themes and have been repeated by KIs throughout the course of this assessment. Fuel has been a vital resource for almost all of the themes, in terms of pumping water for irrigation and drinking water, conducting agricultural activities, collecting waste and for health-related transportation. Fuel has also fluctuated in price throughout the war, yet has remained one of the most expensive commodities. The lack of appropriately qualified and experienced personnel to keep services running to a sufficient standard to meet the requirements of communities is another significant challenge that has been a prominent issue throughout the assessment. Without these skilled workers and technocrats, service delivery has been difficult and personnel have been forced to learn on the job in many cases. More training and sector specific

education for workers is essential to maintain service standards moving forward.



Issues of financing, access for personnel and supply routes, and lack of skilled manpower transcend different themes



With the GoS take-over of southern Syria and the collapse of the main stakeholders – the Local Councils – as an organised administrative and implementary body, along with the suspension of humanitarian and development activities from INGOs and other actors in the south, the pressure will now be on the Russian-backed GoS to deliver vital services to communities in Dara'a and Quneitra. As mentioned throughout the report, the main focus at present is to establish a robust and sustainable security environment in southern Syria. This is no doubt important, but risks neglecting the preservation, expansion and transition of vital basic services to safeguard the health, livelihoods, standard of living and dignity of residents. It is not yet possible to fully understand how the five sectors explored in this assessment will look in the coming weeks, months and years. However, it is paramount that the needs of communities are both maintained and improved as quickly as feasibly possible. There is a definitive need to safeguard the well-being of residents in southern Syria so they can rebuild their lives following this lengthy and destructive conflict, with as much support as possible from the appropriate authorities and actors who will continue operating in the area of focus.

Annex 1.

Scoping Interview Notes (Syria KIs)

WASH

Head of Services Committee – unspecified LC

Survey explanation – understanding of the baseline context prior to the current situation to inform future programming from humanitarian and development actors.

- Q Can you introduce yourself and your responsibilities?**
Responsible for services in LC (WASH).
- Q Who is responsible for getting rid of waste in the local community?**
LC is responsible. Waste is collected once per week. Also dumpsters and voluntary collection.
- Q Do households pay?**
HH used to pay, but due to situation, no one longer pays. LCs now fund all waste management.
- Q How was it before the war and how have things changed?**
it's the same. Dustbin lorry comes once per week.
- Q Do they collect from the whole village once per week?**
90% is covered.
- Q Biggest challenges to weekly waste collection?**
Financial. Salaries. New waste collection vehicles required. Maintenance of fleet.
- Q How much do you pay waste collectors and how many do you employ?**
125-150 US\$ month. 15 people.
- Q That's just dustmen?**
10 driving and collecting waste twice per day. 5 street cleaners. Only getting paid when there is money, otherwise workers volunteer.
- Q Where does LC get money for this from?**
Bakery. Also, no contracts for workers.
- Q Where does collected waste go?**
5km outside of the village waste dump where all the HH waste is burnt by same dustmen.
- Q Is there anything different for other types of waste (e.g. industrial)?**
At the start and end of the week waste is collected from markets (twice per week).
- Q Taken to the same site for burning?**
Different place. Burn it at the market (place of origin) in holes.
- Q Who pays for waste disposal from the market?**
Try to collect money from market owners, but everyone complained, so no one pays.
- Q Are there protocols for medical waste?**
Burnt separately. Each medical centre has a specialist to separate medical and non-medical waste (near non-med disposal location). Building fenced-off waste disposal facility, but not finished. Different waste disposal facility for medical waste. Also 5km from village.
- Q How big re the disposal sites?**
2m depth; 10m width. Medical: 3m depth; 4m width.
- Q Med centres don't pay for waste collection?**
They were not asked to pay.
- Q Tell me about waste from construction sites?**
No collection from sites until now. Civil defence contract, but until now, no collection.
- Q Electronics waste?**
No electronics waste due to war.
- Q Any other disposal methods not discussed.**
So far covered everything. We need more money to pay waste disposal volunteers. Biggest issue.
- Q Contract with civil defence. Any other private or public waste collectors, or all done by LC?**
no private sector. Syrian NGO paid 6 months salary & maintenance of trucks.
- Q How many trucks?**
2. Barely functioning.
- Q Trucks, landfill site, any other infrastructure, such as recycling?**
Not yet, but want more staff, more trucks, and security at disposal site.
- Q Any recycling or reuse? Would it be beneficial?**
Employees collecting waste separate plastic and metal, then sell them to scrap merchants who "recycle".

- Q How much does it cost to run the trucks?**
350 litres of fuel per truck. Each village has a different waste disposal method. In future, they would like a sub-district level coordinated waste disposal plan.
- Q Do you know what small villages without trucks do?**
they ask us to do it and if we can do it we do/will. Once per week depending on availability.
- Q Do all small villages in Jaydor do this?**
There is only one village doing this.

WASH – 12.07.18.

Member of unspecified LC

Responsible for Relief and Waste Management

- Q How does WM work?**
8 years ago before the crisis there were 2 trucks with 4 employees each, who collected twice per day and delivered bins to markets and HHs. Now waste is dumped in a location outside two villages.
- Q Any other organisations collecting waste?**
Sometimes NGOs on 3-6 month contracts. Stopped following current crisis (18th June onwards). 2 months ago NGO started WM project, but none collected during current crisis. Renting 1 truck for waste collection, but Mezrib needs 5 trucks.
- Q How often are you collecting waste and are people paying?**
daily, renting 2 trucks.
- Q How do you provide WM information to the community?**
Waste collected daily, so no need for further information sharing.
- Q Where is HH waste disposed? Landfill?**
Burnt at site 2km from village, or other site 5km from Mseifra village. Could be either market or HH waste.
- Q Other villages using this location for just Mzeireb**
Just this village.
- Q How often each HH collected?**
Twice per week.
- Q How much does it cost to run trucks per week? How many employees?**
700L of fuel per month for both trucks. If they had 5 trucks, would be 1,500L of fuel. Each truck has 4 employees, so 8 total.
- Q Any other employees.**
Just 8.
- Q Different system for medical waste?**
All waste treated the same - can't afford different

systems.

- Q Any other challenges you face with WM?**
affording fuel and salary for staff. Security situation. Security for employees at landfill sites. Don't have bin bags, so throw waste directly in the bin – makes collection harder.
- Q Have you any separation for metal or glass? Ever tried any form of recycling?**
Everything is collected randomly and burned.
- Q How much to rent trucks?**
US\$100 without fuel or salaries. All villages using same process of burning waste – no other option given security situation. Need more support – struggling to collect waste.

Water and Sanitation – 15.07.18.

Responsible for water and dams

- Q What is your role?**
before the crisis, worked for NGOs – now does wells rehabilitation
- Q How many HHs had rehabilitated supply systems?**
Use water tanks to transfer between wells and HHs. Must pay for transport. Fuel expensive, so water costs more.
- Q What were services like before the war?**
There were wells and water networks which would distribute water to all HHs. Fees used to be minimal. Much better before.
- Q Wells damaged and destroyed, or just not functioning?**
Machinery stolen. Water networks damaged. 13-14 wells functioning. 3-4 rehabilitated.
- Q Main stakeholders involved?**
LC main stakeholder. Service Office responsible for wells and water inside the LC.
- Q What services do they provide?**
All services: moving solid waste, drinking water, maintenance of wells, bakeries.
- Q What are their capacities?**
4-5 personnel in Ankhil managing water. 10 waste management personnel.
- Q Any NGOs?**
Several NGOs doing WASH in Kafr Shams. 4 wells rehabilitated and maintained.
- Q Employees paid?**
\$80 month.

Q What relationships exist between LCs and water stakeholders, inc. Jordan?

WASH project in Kafr Shams paid employee's salaries. (Syrian Engineers for Construction and Development). Committee Council to deal with public/population in LC.

Q Main challenges?

Fuel cost. Can't afford fuel for water networks and drinking water. Lack of electricity. Parts too expensive. Using some renewable solar panels.

Q What assets do you currently have?

Sanitation networks available in most villages. Some don't have water pumps, so rent them.

Q Current status of sanitation network?

pipeline deep, so not damaged, but needs maintenance.

Q How much does it cost?

NGO done rehabilitation of network \$7,600. Need an assessment to see what else is required.

Q - What happens to wastewater?

Outside the village. No way to remove.

Q - Main sources of drinking water?

Water from ground wells. Before crisis came from Yarmouk Valley.

Q - Existing supply routes?

Through regime checkpoints from Damascus. Also from Turkey (pass through regimes areas) and Jordan.

Q - 100 kVa generators?

Generators from Turkey, made in France.

Q - Solar panels?

Come from Jordan.

Q - Chlorine powder?

Some NGOs provide chlorine liquid for wells and tablets are available in many markets.

Q How much drinking water available per capita per day?

As a resident less than 10L per day.

Q How often is drinking water supplied?

Depends on family size, but around every 15 days.

Q Which communities suffer most from water scarcity?

Tiha – only 1 well. Namer – well rehab required. Most villages need maintenance.

Q Which communities benefit from dams?

Direct beneficiaries of dams water. Direct access to landowners who connect to pumping lines.

Q Any illegal water usage?

LC coordinate with Governorate Council, so not LC responsibility.

Q Payment methods for water services?

Financial office in LC who use the money for maintenance.

Q Cost per HH for water?

3,000 Syrian Pounds.

Q Any other issues or challenges?

Lack of finances for maintenance.

Water and Sanitation - 16.07.18.

Head of Water Unit – unspecified LC

Q What were water services like before the conflict?

Drinking water: every 2 days for 24 hours available. Sanitation: very good.

Q What is the situation now?

After crisis: NGOs supported rehab of small wells. Nawa used to pump water for local valley 10km away. After GoS took control of valley no access and now dependent on small wells and tents.

Q Where does water for tanks come from?

Private wells selling supply. Sanitation network not working at all.

Q Who are the main stakeholders?

LC. 1 NGO – Temkine.

- Q What services do they provide?**
Before the war – LC used to provide residents with water every 2 days. Now – in Nawa, no services provided. Nasrir village use solar panels.
- Q Do they have any employees or equipment?**
4 employees – water. Plus Head 1 other = 6 total.
- Q What do they do?**
Sheikh Said village they depend on fuel to pump water to water tanks. Raised price of bread to pay for more fuels. Registry names of people in area who to supply. Fill tanks with water. Electricity not available. Water tank cost \$8(?)
- Q What are the operating costs for this (for the LC)?**
Nothing – no source of water in Nawa.
- Q Other villages?**
Wells which function on solar costs \$4 per tank functioning on fuel, e.g. Jasim.
- Q What happens to waste water (no sanitation services)?**
Nawa – goes to dams. Quneitra – Ishbelia dam.
- Q What are the existing supply routes for resources?**
Mostly NGOs provide parts from local market. Temkine NGO.
- Q Main challenges?**
For sanitation – network functioning very well as it is dug in very deep. Drinking water unavailability. Lack of electricity so can't pump water. Auranitis said they would do a survey and didn't. No need for this survey.
- Q Any other payments for residents?**
Pay directly by LC. \$1 per month. Namer – tank costs \$100. Water and solar.
- Q How much drinking water do HH get per day on average?**
In Nawa – tank = \$14 to get tank in house. 30-40L per day per person. In camps around 10L per person per day.
- Q Access to chlorine powder?**
Liquid chlorine for wells. HH – distribute tablets – CARE.
- Q Which communities suffer from drinking water scarcity?**
Nawa. No public wells – just private. Have to pay.
- Q Which communities benefit the most from the dams/pumping rations in Jahil and Mseifra?**
Villages in Kahil and Mseifra have never benefitted from dams. Only when used for irrigation, not drinking water.
- Q Where are pumping stations located.**
Pump near Adawan dam. S of Nawa.
- Q Any further comments?**
Water tanks cost too much – HH pay \$50 per month. Water network – no water – need water!

Health – 26.07.18.

SAMS (Syria)

Everything cross border.

Partner organisations

Nothing really on the market

Staff salaries – only partial. Additional staff – staff getting paid less than partners paying.

UOSSM; MSF; SAMS; WHO; Bluemont (material rehabilitation of physical infrastructure.) SES and SGS (Tatweeer)

Technical training – anaesthesia. Only one anesthesiologist in all region.

Lots of in-kind support.

Minimal local market – painkillers.

Gaziantep – cross-line wages being paid. Minimal coordination.

Cross-line stopped early 2017.

Maintained vaccines

Dr Khalid maintained coordination with GoS to run vaccine programs. In-depth coverage. Lacked Iquneitra due to logistics, but not intentional denial of services.

GIZ paying Dara'a Directorate of Health salaries – impairs visage of neutrality and increases risk of strikes on health facilities. Paying LC's seen as quite different.

Health facilities – funding not meeting needs. Health sector does not have access to budgets. Diaspora (Gulf and America) contributing money to keep facilities running. Don't know how much money.

Structure – took health directorate from pre-war and ran in same way, but didn't have funding/resources.

Shortage of healthcare workers. Med students stepping up as doctors and untrained nurses.

Lacking specialists – only one psychologist in south. Ob/Gyn – 50% male. Only two female physios. Lack of specialists and gender.

Narcotics and psychotropics difficult to move cross-border. Procured cross-line, but after 18th June, no longer available.

Now folding in services to GoS – facilities and personnel.

Warehouses in East all lost – shortage of supplies.

Technically proficient director of health vital for GoS moving forward. Someone good with health systems and personnel management. Needs to be good at formal and informal coordination and maintain neutrality. Health workers in south being treated better than others. Dr Khalid largely responsible for this.

Bolstering LCs and PCs (stabilization) allowed health services to improve.

Dr Khalid compiled roster to monitor health workers movements to maintain health services whilst being displaced.

Irrigation and Agriculture – 17.07.18.

Institution Representative in Dara'a

Introduction from Emmeline

Agriculture in Dara'a in the past three years has been very poor with increased costs and a dire security situation.

- Q Current situation?**
No local councils left to provide services.
- Q Where the LCs providing services before current situation?**
The LCs don't have the money to provide services, so NGOs give support in the form of finances.
- Q Where you involved in workshops? Do they remain relevant?**
No longer relevant – people too concerned by current security situation.
- Q Workshop recommendations still valid?**
Due to current situation, they are no longer valid, as NGO personnel at risk.
- Q VCs – livestock, dairy, vegetables. Currently harvest time – how does current situation effect this?**
People are working on livestock and dairy, but prices reduced. One sheep used to cost 25k Syrian Pounds, but now costs 10k Syria Pounds. Shepards moving locations with their animals. Vegetables are being produced, but farms access for displaced farmers difficult, as some farms have fallen under GoS control.
- Q Will farmers still have access to their land if it is falls under GoS control?**
25 days without irrigating crops. If it gets to 30 days, farmers will likely lose their crops.
- Q What key value chains are still functioning in the current situation, or need immediate support?**
What has already been harvested and everything went well. Olives will be harvested in November, depending on security situation. Require fuel for water pumps for irrigation. Need fertilizer – don't have access. Some fertilizers are available, but low quantities and expensive. Still coming into the local market. Some sellers mixing fertilizer with salt to increase quantity, so will destroy crops...

General Situation – 17.07.18.

Anonymous

Cost of inputs increased with taxation factor. Used to have informal checkpoints from As-Suweida which taxed farmers, but these checkpoints no longer exist.

- Q Deflated prices for livestock? Restricted to certain areas?**
Near to the Jordanian borders. Large animal herders selling their animal feed. A lot of demand and fear due to displacement. Animal costs reduced by 30-50%. Liter of milk suffered 40% reduction. Distributing for free, as herders don't have the capacity to sell it. Price of meat reduced by 30%.
- Q Trend also seen in vegetables?**
Main areas in Eastern Dara'a have been affected. Fuel has significant impact. Procurement process is currently very hard due to checkpoints transporting from Damascus. Herders moving to Tel Shehab. Fuel prices increased by 200%. Quneitra has a high level of dams compared to the rest of the sector.
- Q How do IDP farmers cope?**
Can't irrigate land. Small farmers don't have the ability to continue farming. Larger farmers have the capacity.

Agriculture and Irrigation – 19.07.18.

Agricultural Engineer

- Q How has the current situation affected the agricultural sector?**
security situation – villages under control of GoS have no support for agriculture. Cereal production has been poor (wheat and grain) due to lack of rain.
- Q Are producers able to sell what they have harvested already? How has this been affected?**
Trade is ongoing for summer crops. Some not yet harvested, but crops are still being sold at markets once they have been harvested. May not be sold at usual market thought.
- Q Since GoS has taken control, have the wholesalers and traders that producers/farmers trade with changed?**
Farmers are dealing with a middle-man who takes all products for sale in a major market in Jasim. Some traders have not changed since current crisis.

- Q Have the prices changed since the current situation?**
Prices are not stable. Depends on availability of products. Today, vegetables not available in the market, as road closed due to offensive.
- Q Do local residents have the purchasing power to buy products at inflated prices and are they willing to pay higher prices?**
Vegetable are available in every market in each village. Prices are not too expensive despite the situation.
- Q Are production and processing facilities such as mills and tomato puree factories still functioning?**
Tomato puree processing facilities have only been open for one week as the season just started.
- Q Factories damaged?**
Some are. Depends upon the level of conflict in the area.
- Q Is there any plan in the upcoming weeks to bring support to farmers and market ctors by GoS forces in recently reconciled areas?**
Plan to provide electricity and fuel. If marketing process in a good situation it's better for farmers and if borders open for trade outside Syria it would be much better.
- Q What is the role of women in the production and purchasing and markets?**
Engaging in processing, but not in farming due to cultural issues.
- Q Any support being provided by NGOs and other agencies?**
CARE distributing seeds and fertilizer. Not enough provided.
- Q Any plans for coming weeks?**
NGOs have stopped programming in GoS territory.
- Q How did Ministry of Irrigation operate in Opposition territory?**
Pre-crisis – dams opened in June and irrigation tunnels take water to land near dams and farmers pumped water.
- Q Who was responsible for operating the dams during the crisis?**
Currently same systems and same people – GoS employees.
- Q What services are provided?**
Ministry of Irrigation never provided services. NGOs provided support – AFAK and Olive Branch maintained.
- Q Do landowners pay?**
Free from dams.
- Q Where do resources come from and are they available? (fuel, solar panels)**
Fuel – illegal crossing. Parts – local market. Solar panels – available widely through regime or from Jordan.
- Q What's the process for bringing solar panels from Jordan?**
All come through GoS – some from China or Jordan.
- Q Which communities are most affected by shortage of water for irrigation?**
No irrigation water in Dara'a – just from wells. Quneitra well irrigated from dams.
- Q What are the main challenges?**
Dara'a: water fees so expensive – pumping fuel. 1-2 week need a water tank.
- Q How many dams are there in Quneitra?**
4 – Hajeh; Kodneh; Sahem Golan; Um-Aletham.
- Q Are they in good condition?**
more water in dams this year than last. Need some maintenance, but not too bad. Hard to maintain with current situation.
- Q Is dam water used for anything else?**
Open all dams. Open tunnels in winter if heavy rain. If another dam in is low on water, they will open dam tunnels at other dams to help fill.
- Q Any further comments?**
Supporting farmers – import products, fuel, fertilizer, seeds, etc.

IRRIGATION

- Q How has the current situation affected the irrigation?**
Depends on area. IDPs returning, so easier for farmers to operate.
- Q Drought?**
Dara'a: wells functioning. Prices of fuel – solar much easier. Quneitra: dams – easily distributed.
- Q Who are the main stakeholders responsible?**
Quneitra – Ministry of Irrigation responsible for dams. Dara'a – more than one farmer might buy a well and have an agreement to distribute.

Agriculture and Irrigation – 19.07.18.

Agricultural Engineer

Q *How is the current situation impacting the agricultural sector in terms of production, processing, trade, etc.?*

Due to huge displacement, farmers were forced to leave their land. Unsafe to move between areas under GoS control. Farmers are unable to move products.

Q *What areas are most affected?*

Areas in GoS controlled areas now have access to lands and relatively free movement.

**** Cut short for personal security reasons ****

Agriculture and Irrigation – 24.07.18.

Institution representative

Q *What was the irrigation situation like before and are there plans to start irrigating the larger farms to help supply food to larger population?*

GoS working to fix irrigation system. More focus on security, so going slow.

Q *Same for Dara'a and Quneitra?*

Areas under GoS control starting to slowly receive service again.

Q *Receiving any NGO support?*

Syrian Red Crescent giving assistance and some very minor assistance from Government of Russia.

Q *What was the condition of dams before the current situation?*

before this month it was just Western sector gaining/ benefitting from dams, only 3-4 out of 15 dams were working.

Q *Any plans to restore these to working order?*

No plans yet. Nothing will grow this season until October and wont plant again until April.

Q *How are farmers adopting to the current situation?*

If crops are not irrigated from max 15-20 days it will die. Most local crops already died this season. Syrian farmers experiencing biggest livelihoods loss due to situation which affects rest of community.

Generators, fuel and lack of ability to fix machinery.

Overview – 06.08.18.

Anonymous

Q *What were water and sanitation services like before the war?*

Water: GoS provided water services. Lots of pumps – well supplied. Sanitation: Canals took waste to same location. Cesspit taken to same location.

Q *What were services like in the past 7 years?*

Now depend on water wells which belong to individual landowners and districuted among local community.

Q *Who are the main stakeholders?*

Landowners for private and LC for public – taken from farms with wells.

Q *What sort of costs?*

Private more expensive. Depends on size of wells and distance to other houses.

Q *How do wastewater services work now?*

individual and household waste. HH aboveground septic tanks taken/collected by LC and burnt at locations outside villages. Now HH often burn their own waste on private property which causes heightened risk of disease and illness/pollution.

Q *Sewage system/canals still working?*

Damaged and lack of maintenance from lack of money. Not working.

Q *What is likely to happen now? What are the main challenges?*

GoS will try to fix these services, but will take a long time. Stated all services will be up and running in all locations in 6 months, but given the scale of damage and lack of services, it is somewhat unrealistic to see this as a feasible forecast.

Irrigation:

Q *What were services like before and what are they like now?*

Hasn't changed too much during the conflict.

Q *How has the recent conflict changed the irrigation system?*

Hasn't had too much effect. The longer the farmers are displaced the worse.

Q *Who is responsible for services?*

GoS can now give services. Dependent upon whether they support GoS or not...

Q Dams and systems still working?
Mostly working, but some damaged.

Q Any plans to fix these?
GoS will fix, but security first priority.

WM

Q How was WM functioning in most villages/LCs during the conflict
Depends on whether they're with GoS or against.

Q How was waste collected before 18 June?
Before war Municipality Govt. During war, LC. Now transitioning back to GoS.

Q Services under LC were run well during war?
Better under GoS – less pollution. More funds to collect waste.

Q Any plans for GoS to start services again?
Currently handing over services to GoS. More concern for security situation and reconciliation. Handing over hospitals in some cases – FSA and LCs.

Overview – 07.08.18.

Anonymous

Health

Currently handing over services to GoS. More concerned by security situation and reconciliation. Handing over hospitals in some cases to FSA and LCs.

Dr Abdullah coordinating services. Records always shared by opposition health personnel and retained by GoS prior to most recent crisis. Records always retained for patients by GoS prior to most recent crisis. Constant coordination between GoS and Drs. Allowed supplies in partially for children. However, heavy limitations on supplies allowed to enter opposition areas. Health facilities were heavily targeted by airstrikes during the most recent conflict and throughout the war.

Health centres and hospitals have moved to residential housing basements when the conflict escalated to avoid targeting.

some patients were evacuated to Jordan, Israel and some to GoS (Damascus) for medical care. Particularly children when possible.

Q Water services before the war?
Some villages had very poor access to water.

Q Stakeholders?
Services Committee in LC.

Q Services provided?
LC oversee water trucks distributing drinking water supplies.

Dera'a is known for having plenty of groundwater resources. No real shortage.

If one well in a village is damaged and not operational, having to ship water from another location can prove very expensive, due to the high fuel prices and required transportation.

No revenue for LC except through bakeries.

Overview – 03.08.18.

Anonymous

Q Access to land: can farmers easily access their lands?
Farmers can access their lands easily

Q What are the constraints for IDPs to access their lands when they return?
Currently there are no constraints

Q Vet services: What veterinary services are available?
No veterinary services are available, there are services such as vaccines in some units of the Syrian state in some areas

Q Who provides them? (GoS, local councils, humanitarian agencies?)
By guidance units (affiliated to Syrian state)

Q What services are provided by GoS in reconciled areas with regards to agriculture?
Currently there are no services

Q Women participation: how do they engage in VCs (production, processing, marketing)?
They are involved in farming and harvesting. They participate in the process of manufacture of pickles and jams, and the manufacture of dairy, cheese and household derivatives. Some women work as retailers.

Q Are there women groups still functioning? What is their role / constraints?
Yes, there are active women's groups and their role is to be the main factor in all stages of the value chain. The most important constraints are the lack of production inputs sometimes and the lack of financial capacity to maintain or develop business. Also, trade movement is weak because markets depends on internal trade and not outside the province.

Agriculture – 22.07.18.

Anonymous

Q *What are the main sources of income in the agricultural sector (disaggregated by district, gender, and age)?*

Livestock (cattle – sheep), Agricultural Crops (Wheat – Barley), Fruit trees (olives – pomegranate – grapes), (peach– plum– pear), it depends on the region like Tafas village is known for tomatoes and pomegranate, Nawa village is known for potatoes and Quneitra for animal husbandry and okra cultivation.

Q *Which agricultural value chains show the greatest difference between supply and demand (either supply < demand or supply > demand)?*

Supply > demand in local markets

Q *What are the main social and public structures and institutions (e.g. local councils, community elders, woman groups, tribal networks, armed groups) that frame the enabling environment for local economic activity?*

Local councils

Q *What are the main challenges regarding the agricultural sector in the current situation (including with reconciliation agreements) and perspectives for coming months?*

1-Fuel is expensive. 2- High transportation fees. 3- fertilizers are expensive. 4- Lack of water. 5- Difficulty in marketing. 6- Since it is possible for the Government to provide fuel to farmers and thus reduce the price of fuel which lead to a reduction in the mandate of transport and marketing and finally a low production requirements.

Q *What are the dysfunctionalities of the agricultural value chains in the current situation (on the input-side; output-side; assets; transportation; other bottlenecks)?*

1-Some inputs are still unavailable. 2- deterioration of production because vegetable crops were in the harvest stage and the region escalated, which led the farmer to leave his crops without irrigation as a result of security concerns (Low production). 3- In areas of clashes the wells and irrigation networks were exposed to theft.

Q *Who are the main civil, private and public structures and institutions (e.g. local councils, directorates, associations, cooperatives, companies, traders, tribal networks, (I)NGO, armed groups) involved?*

Directorates – Cooperative societies – Agricultural pharmaceutical companies and agricultural material requirements – Veterinary companies

Q *How do they operate and what power dynamics exist between them?*

Directorates (working within the Government plan). Cooperative societies (several members of farmers form a kind of union work within the internal system based on the decisions of the rules of procedure through which they serve members belonging to this union, So that the members are elected by the individuals affiliated with it and under the supervision of the state so that there is a decision of the government to bring such a union. Agricultural material supply companies (private companies providing agricultural inputs licensed by the Government.)

Q *What services (e.g. provision of subsidized fodder) and roles that are instrumental to the functioning of the value chains have been fulfilled by these stakeholders before the crisis?*

Fodder is available (materials imported from the state to traders to breeders) local materials from the farmer's product to the breeders.

Q *What are the technical and financial capacity gaps and other reasons that prevent the stakeholders from assuming their pre-crisis role?*

For our farmers, there is a gap between the agricultural supervisor and the farmer, so that the farmer is considered with good experience in his agricultural field, He has practical experience acquired it through the agricultural guide, but when he is exposed to a new problem he goes to the guide to be solved by the agricultural guide, because agriculture is same as the rest of science there is a continuous development in all areas of agriculture every new day there is a new development and research in the agricultural field, Whether at the level of the development of varieties or agricultural medicines or methods of prevention and control of agricultural pests.

Q *Have there been any changes in agricultural practices? If yes, what and why?*

Yes, use of modern techniques by farmers in terms of improved seed for hybrid grains and vegetables. For vegetables there are some modern methods of control use of artificial insemination. As for the livestock sector, there are scientific methods for the use of agricultural mixtures for the feeding of animals.

Q *Is the quarantine system in the governorate still active and working? If yes, to what extent?*

No

Health – 04.08.18.

Senior Doctor

- Da'el folding in health workers
- Health partners cross-border supplies
- Very few in-country purchases
- Portion of HoP staff covered - Pooled and divided up
- Tech training needed
- Gaziantep supporting in the south?
- Unknown now how.
- Cross-Line early 2017 support stopped
- MoH support with vaccines
- Via MoH employees crossing in
- Not denying this service internationalu
- Quneitra under-covered because of logistics
- Stabz actor: infrastructure rehab/solar panel – micro grants to LCs
- GIZ paying Dara'a DoH members – bad for neutrality – hinders capacity to implement
- Health facilities have diaspora relationship – fund activities – remittances – little insight on how much
- Current Dara'a DoH followed GoS structure
- Primary healthcare centres – no hospitals – underequipped
- Primary concern is shortage of healthcare workers
- Mobile med teams increasingly relevant – Decrease chance of targeting – Drs and staff currently displaced – can move as lines shift
- Many drugs no longer available on local market
- Moving Telshihab stocks to the west and Quneitra
- Mobile units lose surgery capacity and reproductive health capacity
- Eastern sector affected – camps lose capacity – no dialysis capacity etc.
- Targeting of health facilities – 7 facilities – 3 hosp, 4 phc
- Going to open up MMUs on the border
- Dr Khalid understands management
- Will be hard to get online because of crisis

- Tatweer and SES empowered directorates and bolstered capacity
- Compiling roster and capacity map in the east and then directing NGOs and Stab to respond.

Agriculture

Institution representative

- Past 3 years, situation miserable because of security, production costs more expensive for farmers
- No LCs left to provide any services for farmers
- LCs very poor and cannot provide services, NGOs have provided support, agricultural baskets (fertilizers, etc) 50-60 USD per basket. Not enough to cover costs.
- In the current situation, people are now focusing on getting their daily bread, not so much in agricultural support
- Danger for agencies to work because of GoS takeover
- Current situation of VCs:
- Livestock VC still functioning for dairy and meat, selling at lesser prices so herders lose money (Sheep 3 months ago 20 000 SYP, now 10 000 SYP). Displaced with their sheep. Want to make sure they can secure their herds. But lack of access to market channels.
- Vegetables: Few amounts produced, farmers don't have access to their farms (far away or in GoS controlled areas). Access to land a big issue. 25 days for farmers without irrigating their crops, if displaced for 35 days, they will lose their crops. Nobody knows what will happen in the coming weeks.
- Wheat: harvest season finished, 'everything went well'.
- Olives to be harvested in Nov depending on security situation.
- Fruits being produced but need fuel (irrigation) and fertilizers
- Imported fertilizers are available on local markets, plus some basic ones. There might be some cheating in selling, as some people are mixing

Agriculture – 22.07.18.

Syrian NGO representative

- LCs are still active – not sure how long it will take, what stability. Nothing in agr support. Mostly, role = coordination
- Number of checkpoints reduced between Dar'a and Damascus in reconciled areas so potentially less taxation.
- Cost of inputs increase.
- Herders moving to Tal Shihab, Zayzoun, SW of Dar'a and Quneitra. Selling but no demand.
- Milk from 135 to 75 SYP per litre, or even sometimes distribute for free
- Meat same 1500 to 700 SYP/kg
- Potato, cucumber and tomatoes in Eastern Dar'a, more affected than in Tafs
- Tomato more affected as need more water
- Lack of fuel for water pumps.
- People focusing on daily bread needs
- RTE rations – very expensive canned bought from Damascus (dates, tuna, etc)
- Quick impact activities
- West part of Dar'a, grain and animal feed vendors are moving to SW dar'a, Tal Shihab new businesses and new vendors – traders as it is more secure.
- SW area more accessible from eastern and western Dar'a.
- NW and Q = IDPs
- Moving herds and products, vaccination and medication are all costly
- Fuel prices doubled so sometimes moving is not profitable.
- Farmers moving near to dams in Quneitra, but not applicable to smaller farmers, mostly to large farmers.
- Small farmers may have better access to fuel at 'low' prices when checkpoint taxation reduces.

Agriculture – 22.07.18.

Agricultural engineer

- Current security situation: regime took control of half of Dar'a, villages under GoS control don't have support or services regarding agriculture.
- Production: for cereals, somehow good, but not as usual because of the lack of rain
- Trade of agricultural produce:
- Tomato, aubergine, potato – trade is ongoing for summer crops, some still growing, either in local markets or in neighbouring villages
- Farmers depend on marketing, selling these products to wholesalers who then distribute to other traders
- Farmers are dealing with the same middlemen as before, selling on Jasim wholesale market and exporting to even other countries.
- Prices? Unstable, depend on supply. For example, when roads are closed due to military operations, vegetables from certain areas cannot reach WS market so prices go up.
- Processing facilities? Only private mills functional. One week ago, tomato paste factory started working again as it is the season.
- Local demand? Veggies available in every arket in each village so HHs can access them. Financial situation: prices are fine, not too expensive.
- Support from agencies? CARE – distributed seeds and fertilizers, distributed quantity was not enough
- GoS support : Plan to support electricity and fuel prices, whole of Dar'a under regime control.
- Marketing going well, it will be better for farmers in reconciled areas, especially with opening of borders
- Women: Working in processing factories (ie tomato paste), but not in farming.
- Security constraints and irrigation: IDPs have returned to their homes in this area, no problem with access to land
- There are dams in Quneitra so better access to irrigation
- Ministry of Irrigation was responsible for dams, lately they added residents

Agriculture

Agency representative

- Staff of SIG, Directorates, Offices (GOSM, SPEG, Directorate of Livestock): all have left. Have to be linked with GoS. Waiting to see what happens.
- No institutions in place. Only military
- Afraid – most officials are hiding.
- Ordinary food markets open for daily needs (priority food eg bread).
- Nasib mill not functioning currently, staff out.

- Some buildings taken over by GoS, but no stealing / looting witnessed for land.
- Women role unchanged, but KI imagines that the number of women working in agriculture increased as men left. Current situation has not affected this. Travel restrictions apply for all (gender, age). Women travelling in groups (5,6).

Agriculture

Institution representative

- Most agricultural activities on hold. Currently functioning '30%' of normal level.
- Syrian military around city.
- SIG-GOSM will be dissolved, all employees will be kept: promises but nothing confirmed yet. Agreed with GoS. All plans on paper for now. Maybe in 2-3 months.
- Electricity and water coming back in reconciled areas but slowly, affecting harvest.
- Vegetables growing now, 'but less than 10%'
- Large food shortage on markets.
- Small farms more accessible for people to buy directly from them, less travel needed, therefore less exposure. Large farms need staff, large amounts of water and electricity.
- GoS working on repairing irrigation system.
- SARC support + Russian (cover needs for 2 days).
- 3-4 dams out of 15 were working.
- Vegetables not irrigated for more than 15-20 days will be lost. No water.
- Livestock: 1 month ago, one cow = USD 2,000. Now USD 150. No animal feed, no food, need money.
- 2012-2013: resorting to large livestock sales as coping strategies, but to a lesser extent than now.
- Returns: very slow in Eastern Dar'a (restrictions: people don't hold weapons, put GoS flag on houses). Bombing and displacement ongoing in Western Dar'a.